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NOTES
PRO-LIFE JUDGES AND JUDICIAL BYPASS CASES
ERic PARKER BABBS*
This Note examines a "moral/formal" dilemma in judging.'
It addresses the legal and moral situation of a judge who believes
abortion is morally wrong,2 when the law requires that judge to
order permission for a minor to have an abortion without her
parents' notice or consent.
3
How can the judge assess the morality of so cooperating with
abortion? How should the judge respond to any conflict between
the judicial role and the demands of conscience and morality?
We enter "the ethical debate over the proper response ofjudges
to a conflict between law and morality."4 Legal scholars studying
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2008; B.A., Yale University,
2005. Thanks to Amy Coney Barrett, Nicole Garnett, Sarah Pilisz, and Vincent
Rougeau for comments and suggestions on previous drafts of this Note. Thanks
also to the staff of the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy for select-
ing and preparing this Note for publication.
1. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of
Robert M. Cover'sJustice Accused, 7J.L. & RELIGION 33, 38 (1989).
2. 1 will call this judge the "pro-life judge," recognizing the term's limita-
tions but finding none to serve better.
3. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 507-09 (1990)
(describing typical judicial bypass procedure); Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I1), 443
U.S. 622, 647-48 (1979) (plurality opinion) (setting forth constitutionally-man-
dated standards for judicial waiver of parental consent requirement). See gener-
ally Teresa S. Collett, Seeking Solomon's Wisdom: Judicial Bypass of Parental
Involvement in a Minor's Abortion Decision, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 513 (2000); Stephen
P. Rosenberg, Note, Splitting the Baby: When Can a Pregnant Minor Obtain an Abor-
tion Without Parental Consent? The Ex Parte Anonymous Cases (Alabama 2001), 34
CONN. L. REV. 1109 (2002).
4. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 46. For articles addressing such conflicts, see
JohnJ. Coughlin, Divorce and the Catholic Lauyer, 61 JURIST 290 (2001);John H.
Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges and Capital Cases, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 303
(1998); ORI LEV, Personal Morality and Judicial Decisionmaking in the Death Penalty
Context, 11 J.L. & RELIGION 637 (1994-1995); William H. Pryor, Jr., The Religious
Faith and Judicial Duty of an American Catholic Judge, 24 YALE L. & POL'v REv. 347
(2006); Antonin Scalia, God's Justice and Ours, FIRST THINGS, May 2002, at 17.
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such conflicts recently have turned to this 'judicial bypass" scena-
rio as a test case.5
While this Note is as concerned with providing a reasoned
analysis as with formulating conclusions, it agrees with other
treatments finding that judicial bypass cases pose a serious issue
of wrongful judicial cooperation in evil.6 It also agrees with those
commentators who have concluded that morally conflicted
judges probably can and should recuse themselves from bypass
cases.7 Part I analyzes the constitutional and statutory law gov-
erning judicial bypass, showing how it requires the judge to issue
permission for an abortion if the minor is sufficiently mature and
well informed to make the decision on her own. Part II turns to
case law and explains ways in which pro-life judges hearing
bypass cases could make the procedure marginally more respon-
sive to the state interest in encouraging childbirth over abortion
and expressing respect for fetal life. Part III begins a moral analy-
sis based on the Catholic moral tradition, considering whether a
judge who issues a bypass cooperates immorally in abortion. Part
IV examines recusal from bypass cases as one way that a judge
can avoid complicity in abortion while remaining true to his or
her legal duties. Part V examines resignation from the bench as
another option in jurisdictions where recusal is unavailable or
imprudent.
I. THE LEGAL RIGHT TO JUDICiAL BYPASs
Although, as a constitutional matter, states are free to
require parental notice or consent for minors' abortions,' paren-
5. See Edward A. Hartnett, Catholic Judges and Cooperation in Sin, 4 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 221, 249-51, 255-57 (2007) (addressing judicial bypass); Gregory
A. Kalscheur, Catholics in Public Life: Judges, Legislators, and Voters, 46 J. CATH.
LEGAL STUD. 211, 245-50 (2007) (addressing judicial bypass, again in the con-
text ofjudges' moral duties).
6. See Hartnett, supra note 5, at 257 (concluding that, for moral reasons,
"Catholic judges should not decide judicial bypass proceedings"); Kalscheur,
supra note 5, at 248 (finding that bypass proceedings likely involve "culpable
material cooperation in evil").
7. See, e.g., Rebekah L. Osborn, Note, Beliefs on the Bench: Recusal for Relig-
ious Reasons and the Model Code ofJudicial Conduct, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 895,
903 (2006); Lauren Treadwell, Note, Informal Closing of the Bypass: Minors' Peti-
tions to Bypass Parental Consent for Abortion in an Age of IncreasingJudicial Recusals,
58 HASTINGS L.J. 869, 877 (2007); cf Paul Danielson, Judicial Recusal and a
Minor's Right to an Abortion, 2 Nw.J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 125 (2007) (finding recusal
from bypass cases to be likely permitted under existing law, although problem-
atic as a policy matter).
8. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 327
(2006) (collecting cases and statutes); William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Valid-
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tal involvement laws cannot interpose any "substantial obstacle"9
to abortion when the minor is mature and well informed, or
when abortion is in her best interest. Specifically, the Supreme
Court has held that minors have a constitutional right to abor-
tion, though more subject to regulation than in the case of
adults."0 The Court also has held that a minor who is both
mature and well informed about abortion, or who can show that
abortion is in her best interests, has a right to abortion without
the consent of her parents or anyone acting in loco parentis.1 In
Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I), a plurality of the Court concluded
that:
[U]nder state regulation such as that undertaken by Massa-
chusetts, every minor must have the opportunity-if she so
desires-to go directly to a court without first consulting or
notifying her parents. If she satisfies the court that she is
mature and well enough informed to make intelligently the
abortion decision on her own, the court must authorize her to
act without parental consultation or consent. If she fails to sat-
isfy the court that she is competent to make this decision
independently, she must be permitted to show that an abortion
nevertheless would be in her best interests. If the court is per-
suaded that it is, the court must authorize the abortion.
1 2
Although the State may condition minors' access to abortion on
notice to one parent,13 perhaps without judicial bypass as an
ity, Construction, and Application of Statutes Requiring Parental Notification of or Con-
sent to Minor's Abortion, 77 A.L.R. 1 (2005).
9. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000) (declaring it an
"established principle[ " that an abortion regulation is unconstitutional if it
"'has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.'" (quoting Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992))); accord Gonzales v.
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1626-27 (2007).
10. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
74-75 (1976) (positing that the strictures of Roe and Doe apply to regulations of
minors' access to abortion).
11. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416,
439-40 (1983) (invalidating a parental consent ordinance because it did not
contain the bypass procedure outlined in Bellotti 11), overruled by Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I),
443 U.S. 622, 647-48 (1979) (plurality opinion) (concluding that any parental
consent requirement must contain an exception for a minor who can show a
court she is "mature and well enough informed" to make an abortion decision
independently); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (holding that "the State may not
impose a blanket provision ... requiring the consent of a parent or person in
loco parentis" as a condition for minor's abortion).
12. Betlotti II, 443 U.S. at 647-48 (emphasis added).
13. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 450 (1990) (invalidating two-
parent notice requirement because it "does not reasonably further any legiti-
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option,14 any parental involvement requirement would have to
satisfy the Court's undue-burden test or a variant thereof.15
Even though the Supreme Court perhaps will not require
judicial bypass of parental notice requirements (as opposed to
bypass of parental consent requirements), the states have chosen
to provide judicial bypass of both types of requirements. Twenty-
four states require parental consent, and eleven other states
require parental notice.16 All thirty-five states provide for judicial
bypass of these requirements. 7 The bypass provisions incorpo-
rate some version of the standard held to be constitutionally
required in Bellotti II. For example, Texas's bypass provision
reads:
If the court finds that the minor is mature and sufficiently
well informed, that [parental] notification would not be in
the minor's best interest, or that notification may lead to
physical, sexual, or emotional abuse of the minor, the
court shall enter an order authorizing the minor to consent
to the performance of the abortion without notification to
either of her parents .... 18
Note that the Texas law says "shall": granting the bypass is
mandatory, not optional, for the court if the minor makes the
requisite showing. In every state with a parental notice or consent
mate state interest," state interest in parental involvement being fully satisfied
by notice to one parent); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 407-10 (1981)
(upholding parental notice requirement as less burdensome than parental con-
sent requirement).
14. Federal courts have divided on whether a parental notice require-
ment must contain a provision for judicial bypass, and the Supreme Court has
declined to rule on the issue. Compare Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v.
Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1459 (8th Cir. 1995) (answering affirmatively), cert. denied,
517 U.S. 1174 (1996), with Planned Parenthood of the Blue Ridge v. Camblos,
155 F.3d 352, 372 (4th Cir. 1998) (answering negatively), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
1140 (1999). See also Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 510
(1990) (declining to decide the issue).
15. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876
(1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (setting forth
undue burden standard).
16. Guttenmacher Inst., State Policies in Brief: Parental Involvement in
Minors' Abortions (Jan. 1, 2008), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/
spibs/spib-PIMA.pdf; see also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546
U.S. 320, 326 n.1 (2006).
17. Guttenmacher Inst., supra note 16. In addition, seven other states
have parental involvement laws not currently enforced. Id.
18. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(i) (Vernon 2002) (emphasis added);
see also, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-304(e) (2005) ("The consent require-
ment shall be waived if the court finds either that: (1) The minor is mature and
well-informed enough to make the abortion decision on the minor's own; or
(2) The performance of the abortion would be in the minor's best interests.").
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law, judges will be required to determine whether a minor is suf-
ficiently mature and well informed or whether abortion is in her
best interest. If the judge makes either determination in the
affirmative, the judge must order permission for the minor's
abortion.
These constitutional and statutory standards preclude a
judge from denying bypass based on an all-things-considered
analysis of the minor's best interests. If the minor shows she is
mature and sufficiently well informed, the judge cannot deny
bypass on the ground that abortion is not in her best interests. If
the minor shows that abortion is in her best interest, the judge
cannot deny bypass on the ground that parental involvement is
also in her best interest. 9 If the minor satisfies either the
"mature and sufficiently well informed" test or the "best inter-
ests" test, the judge must grant permission for an abortion.
The judge also has no authority to deny permission for abor-
tion by invoking respect for unborn human life. The "mature
and sufficiently well informed" standard, which focuses only on
the minor's capacity to choose, excludes consideration of
whether abortion is a morally desirable outcome. The "best inter-
ests" standard is more flexible, but does not provide a ready
mechanism for the judge to second-guess the minor's assertion
that abortion is best for her. Neither does it explicitly or implic-
itly allow the judge to balance the minor's interests against those
of the unborn fetus.
Nor is it likely that the judge has authority to deny bypass
based on pro-life reasons kept concealed. If the judge issues an
order denying bypass that is silent as to the reasons, the judge
could fail a requirement that a bypass ruling state appropriate
findings of fact and conclusions of law20 or otherwise furnish
matter for appellate review. 1 An appellate court could vacate
and remand, ordering the judge to make his/her reasoning suffi-
ciently explicit to admit review, 22 or alternatively the appellate
19. See In re Anonymous, 905 So. 2d 845, 848 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005)
(reversing when the trial court denied bypass on the ground that the minor did
not show that bypass, as distinct from abortion with parental consent, was in her
best interest).
20. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206(f) (West 2000) ("[T]he court
shall make in writing specific factual findings and legal conclusions supporting
its decision ...."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(6)(c) (iii) (West 2005) (same).
21. See Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I1), 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979) (plurality
opinion) ("The [bypass] proceeding .... and any appeals that may follow,
[must] .. .provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained.").
22. See, e.g., Ex parte Anonymous, 889 So. 2d 518, 519 (Ala. 2003)
(remanding to trial court when bypass denial was too conclusory to admit
2008]
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court could render a decision for the minor." Also, if the judge
denies bypass based on pro-life reasons kept concealed, the deci-
sion could appear arbitrary to the minor affected, running afoul
of the Supreme Court's concern that bypass not be denied
arbitrarily.24
II. PRO-LIFE JUDGES APPLYING BYPASS LAw
Whether states' parental involvement laws are good policy or
not is beyond the scope of this Note,25 and states differ in the
rigor of their enforcement. 26 More relevant to pro-life judges is
the fact that the state has a legitimate interest, as the Supreme
Court has recognized, in protecting unborn life throughout the
term of pregnancy.27 Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the
state from acting on a preference for childbirth, so long as it
places no "substantial obstacle" to a woman's freedom of
choice.28 The Court emphasized this recently in Gonzales v. Car-
hart, explaining that state regulations that "do no more than cre-
ate a structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or
meaningful appellate review); In re E.B.L., 544 So. 2d 333, 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1989) (same).
23. See In re Doe 10, 78 S.W.3d 338, 340-41 (Tex. 2002) (holding that
statute required the Texas Supreme Court to grant petition where trial court
failed plain statutory requirement to issue written findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law).
24. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)
("[T] he State does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an
absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his
patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for with-
holding the consent.").
25. For articles engaging in this debate, see Collett, supra note 3, at 545,
574-76 (arguing that parental notification will often be in a minor's best inter-
est if, for example, it leads to mental and physical help for post-abortion recov-
ery or discovering that the pregnancy resulted from sexual exploitation); Carol
Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States, 18 Irr'LJ.L. POL'Y & FAM.
305, 306 (2004) (criticizing parental involvement laws as more concerned "with
securing a set of political goals aimed at thwarting access to abortion, restoring
parental authority, and punishing girls for having sex"); Case Comment, Abor-
tion Rights-Parental Consent Requirement, 117 HARv. L. REv. 2785, 2789-90
(2004).
26. "A five-year study of Minnesota bypass hearings revealed that out of
3,573 petitions, nine were denied, six were withdrawn, and 3,558 were granted."
Sanger, supra note 25, at 309 (citing data reported in Hodgson v. Minnesota,
497 U.S. 417 (1990)). Other states' courts have been less sanguine, notably Ala-
bama, which has many reported appeals from bypass denials. See generally
Helena Silverstein & Leanne Speitel, "Honey, I Have No Idea": Court Readiness to
Handle Petitions to Waive Parental Consent for Abortion, 88 IowA L. REv. 75 (2002).
27. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992)
(joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
28. Id. at 877-78.
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guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of
the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to
the woman's exercise of the right to choose.
29
In bypass hearings, therefore, judges may exercise available
discretion to conduct the hearings and apply the law in a way
that recognizes an unborn life is at stake. To the extent statutory
law permits,judges constitutionally may use the bypass hearing to
implement "structural mechanism[s] . . . [that] express
profound respect for the life of the unborn."3 ° This Part explains
three ways in which judges can do so: appointing fetal guardians,
considering whether the minor seeking bypass is morally well
informed, and criticizing permissive abortion laws.
A. Appointing Fetal Guardians
First, thejudge may have discretion to appoint a guardian ad
litem for the minor's fetus, as at least Alabama judges have had
permission to do.31 Some Alabama judges have appointed fetal
guardians routinely.3 2 The practice has been commended33 and
criticized,34 but the most thorough analysis concludes that it is
constitutional. 5 Insofar as the appointment of a guardian
29. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1627 (2007) (quoting Casey, 505
U.S. at 877).
30. See id. For an argument that judges should do so, see Paulsen, supra
note 1, at 74 ("[For the pro-life judge,] [t]he natural right to life serves, intersti-
tially, to supply the governing rule of law wherever positive law is not expressly to
the contrary and as a choice of law principle in conflict-of-laws situations.").
31. See Ex parte Anonymous, 810 So. 2d 786, 796 (Ala. 2001) (Lyons, J.,
concurring in the result) (noting the court did not reach the issue, presented
on appeal of whether guardian for fetus was proper, but opining in the affirma-
tive); In re Anonymous, 720 So. 2d 497, 501 (Ala. 1998) (Hooper, C.J., concur-
ring) (arguing for propriety of fetal guardians in bypass cases, as consistent with
appointment of fetal guardians in other contexts, and with legislature's intent
in enacting parental consent statute). But see In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1190
(Fla. 1989) (stating without elaboration that appointment of fetal guardian was
"clearly improper").
32. Ex parte Anonymous, 810 So. 2d 786, 789 (Ala. 2001) (relating that
trial judge told petitioner it was his "practice" to appoint guardian for fetus
because abortion is "something that is extremely serious and fatal for your
child"); Helena Silverstein, In the Matter of Anonymous, A Minor: Fetal Representa-
tion in Hearings to Waive Parental Consent for Abortion, 11 CORNEU J.L. & PUB.
POL'v 69, 87 (2001).
33. See M. Todd Parker, Note, A Changing of the Guard: The Propriety of
Appointing Guardians for Fetuses, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1419, 1461-62 (2004).
34. Silverstein, supra note 32, at 105-06 (concluding that appointment of
a fetal guardian makes the bypass process more "challenging," that is, more
time consuming and potentially intimidating, for the minor).
35. Id. at 102-06. Silverstein reasons that Casey allows the state to "'create
a structural mechanism ...to express profound respect for the life of the
20081
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manifests the court's respect for the fetus as at least potential
human life, it serves as a constitutionally-licit "structural mecha-
nism by which the State... may express profound respect for the
life of the unborn. 3 6
Appointing a fetal guardian may also serve the interest of
truth-finding in the bypass proceeding. Unless a guardian is
appointed, the bypass proceeding is ex parte: there will be no
one representing the state's interest in enforcing the parental
consent requirement or presenting an argument that the minor
is not sufficiently mature. When a fetal guardian is appointed,
the guardian may cross-examine the minor,38 ensuring a com-
plete story and helping the court to determine the minor's credi-
bility. The guardian may also call witnesses and present
evidence,3" affording the court a fuller view of facts than if only
the minor and her attorney appeared. These features of adver-
sary litigation could, however, be objected to on the grounds that
they tend to humiliate or shame the minor out of abortion, hin-
dering her freedom to choose.
B. Considering Whether the Minor Is Morally Well Informed
Second, a judge could consider, as relevant to whether a
minor is well informed, her knowledge of fetal life and consider-
ation of moral arguments against abortion. The Supreme Court
in Casey said that the state has a legitimate interest in
"encourag[ing] [a woman] to know that there are philosophic
unborn'" and that this, not a desire to prevent abortions, is the primary pur-
pose of Alabama judges appointing fetal guardians. Id. at 102 (quoting Casey,
505 U.S. at 877 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,JJ.) (citation
omitted)). Silverstein concludes that appointment of a fetal guardian could not
be deemed unduly burdensome under Supreme Court precedent upholding
twenty-four-hour waiting periods. Id. at 106.
36. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)
(joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
37. Parker, supra note 33, at 1462; see also Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's
Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1873,
1891-92 (1996) (expressing concern that in an ex parte proceeding where no
opposing party challenges the evidence presented, the court's finding as to the
minor's maturity will lack objective basis).
38. See Ex parte Anonymous, 889 So. 2d 518, 518 (Ala. 2003); Ex parte
Anonymous, 810 So. 2d 786, 788 (Ala. 2001) (noting that "[t]he lawyer
appointed for the fetus . . . subjected [the minor] to a probing cross-examina-
tion" concerning her knowledge of the risks of abortion and of alternatives to
abortion); Silverstein, supra note 32, at 87-88 (reporting that in all seventeen
Alabama cases where a fetal guardian was appointed, the guardian extensively
questioned the minor).
39. See In re Anonymous, 720 So. 2d 497, 498 (Ala. 1998); In re Anony-
mous, 733 So. 2d 429, 430 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).
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and social arguments of great weight ... in favor of continuing
the pregnancy to full term."4 " The Court has upheld require-
ments that a woman seeking abortion give informed consent and
receive certain information about the abortion procedure,
including the "'probable gestational age' of the fetus."'" Indiana
law, for example, requires that a woman seeking abortion be
informed of "the probable gestational age of the fetus, including
an offer to provide ... a picture or drawing of a fetus," and that
she be informed of the possibility of viewing a fetal ultrasound
image and hearing the fetus's heartbeat.42
Legal definitions of what is a mature and well informed
minor often are broad enough to encompass assessment of the
minor's knowledge of fetal life and consideration of the morality
of abortion." Typical definitions use broad language and direct
the court to afford considerable weight to the minor's under-
standing of abortion and its alternatives. Definitions may be
either statutory" or judicially constructed. Judicial definitions
may enumerate a comprehensive set of factors45 or a merely illus-
trative one.4 6 Some appellate courts have declined to define
explicitly what is a mature and well-informed minor, leaving the
40. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992)
(joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.); see also Ohio v. Akron
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990) ("A free and enlightened
society may decide that each of its members should attain a clearer, more toler-
ant understanding of the profound philosophic choices confronted by a woman
who is considering whether to seek an abortion.").
41. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-82 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter,JJ.) (overruling City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S.
416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747 (1986)).
42. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1.1(a) (West 2007).
43. On state definitions of what is a mature and well-informed minor, see
generally Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Note, When Is a Pregnant Minor Mature? When Is an
Abortion in Her Best Interests?, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 907 (1992).
44. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.8(d) (2005) (directing court at
bypass hearing to hear evidence relating to, inter alia, "the emotional develop-
ment, maturity, intellect, and understanding of the minor"); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3206(0 (West 2000) (similar).
45. See In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 256 (Tex. 2000) (requiring a minor to
establish that she is mature and sufficiently well informed, to show that she has
obtained information about and understands the health risks of abortion, to
establish that she understands alternatives to abortion, and to establish that she
is "aware of the emotional and psychological aspects of undergoing abortion,"
including how the abortion decision "might affect her family relations"); see also
Collett, supra note 3, at 564-65 (discussing the Texas standard).
46. See In re B.S., 74 P.3d 285, 290 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Bellotti II
for the proposition that "maturity may be measured by examining the minor's
experience, perspective, and judgment") (emphasis added); In re Petition of
Anonymous 1, 558 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Neb. 1997) (same).
2008]
482 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 22
determination's parameters to trial court discretion. 47 The rele-
vant inquiry seems of its nature to be open ended.48
Under any sound definition, the minor's awareness of fetal
life and her consideration of the morality of abortion are rele-
vant to whether she is mature and well informed. Bypass deci-
sions commonly recite a minor's awareness and consideration of
alternatives to abortion in finding that she is indeed mature and
well informed.49 Whether the minor has considered the morality
of abortion pertains to this common and important inquiry of
whether she has considered alternatives, such as adoption or rais-
ing the child. To consider the alternatives intelligently vis-a-vis one
another, the minor has to consider their arguable morality. The
minor's knowledge of fetal life likewise pertains to her knowl-
edge of the abortion procedure-as one court put it, whether
she has "'knowledge necessary to substantially understand the sit-
uation at hand and the consequences of the choices that can be
made. "50
The higher the standard of proof the minor must meet, the
more relevant will be the minor's knowledge of fetal life and con-
sideration of the morality of abortion. Bellotti II assumes that the
burden of proof will rest on the minor,51 and the Supreme Court
has held that a state may require the minor to show maturity or
best interests by clear and convincing evidence.52 The standard
of proof, therefore, varies among states. The Texas and Kansas
statutes both adopt a preponderance standard.53 Some appellate
47. In re R.B., 790 So. 2d 830, 834 (Miss. 2001) (declining to impose a
concrete standard for determining maturity, and suggesting the trial judge
must exercise discretion); In re Doe 1, 566 N.E.2d 1181, 1184-85 (Ohio 1990)
(plurality opinion) (stating that Ohio's bypass statute invests the juvenile court
with "a certain amount of discretion in determining whether" the minor is suffi-
ciently mature and declining to adopt a six-factor test urged by the appellant).
48. See Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I1), 443 U.S. 622, 644 n.23 (1979) (plural-
ity opinion) ("[T]he peculiar nature of the abortion decision requires the
opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of the maturity of pregnant minors.");
Suellyn Scarnecchia &Julie Kunce Field, Judging Girls: Decision Making in Paren-
tal Consent to Abortion Cases, 3 MIcH.J. GENDER & L. 75, 100-10 (1995) (noting a
variety of factors proposed under Michigan law for determining maturity).
49. See, e.g., In re Doe, 485 S.E.2d 354, 358 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997); In re Doe,
615 N.E.2d 1142, 1143 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam).
50. In re Petition of Doe, 866 P.2d 1069, 1074 (Kan. 1994).
51. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 647-48 (concluding that under legitimate
bypass procedure, a court must authorize the minor's abortion decision "[i]f
she satisfies the court that she is mature and well enough informed" but that "if
the court is not persuaded" it may decline to sanction the abortion).
52. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 515-16 (1990).
53. TEx. Fjv. CODE ANN. § 33.003(i) (Vernon 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-6704 (2003).
PRO-LIFE JUDGES AND JUDICIAL BYPASS CASES
courts have implicitly adopted a preponderance standard, requir-
ing the court to grant bypass if there is some evidence the minor
is mature and well informed, and no evidence to the contrary.54
Other states have required a clear and convincing showing,
either by statute5" or judicial decision. 6 When the standard of
proof is clear and convincing evidence, the minor will not neces-
sarily establish her maturity by presenting only some evidence of
maturity, such as that she is a good student, that she is employed,
or that she has plans for the future.57 Her knowledge of fetal life
and consideration of the morality of abortion can thus affect
whether she has established her maturity.
Courts have come close to recognizing that a minor's consid-
eration of the morality of abortion affects whether she is mature
and well informed. Some justices of the Texas Supreme Court
would have required all minors seeking bypass to be informed of
moral arguments against abortion.58 The Nebraska Supreme
Court also has suggested that consideration of the morality of
abortion could evidence the minor's maturity or understanding
of her options. The Nebraska court upheld a finding that a
minor was not mature and well informed because, although she
54. See, e.g., Ex parteAnonymous, 595 So. 2d 497, 498 (Ala. 1992) ("[T]he
petition for wavier of parental consent may be denied only if the court specifi-
cally finds both that (1) the minor is immature and not well enough informed to
make the abortion decision on her own, and (2) that performance of the abor-
tion would not be in her best interests.").
55. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.85(C)(1) (LexisNexis 2007); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5(B)(4) (2001); FLA. STAT. § 390.01114 (2007).
56. In re Petition of Anonymous, 558 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Neb. 1997) ("Con-
sidering the magnitude of the decision at issue, the fact that the proceedings
are ex parte in nature, and recognizing that any evidence will usually satisfy the
preponderance of the evidence standard, we think it necessary that the preg-
nant minor establish, by clear and convincing evidence, her maturity or that the
performance of an abortion upon her without parental notification is in her
best interests.") (emphasis added); In re B.S., 74 P.3d 285, 289 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2003).
57. See, e.g., In re Doe 1, 566 N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (Ohio 1991) (affirming
trial court's ruling that a seventeen-year-old, with a "B" average in high school,
who held part-time jobs and planned to attend college, was not mature and well
enough informed); H.B. v. Wilkinson, 639 F. Supp. 952, 957-58 (D. Utah 1986)
(concluding that seventeen-year-old, a good student who planned to attend col-
lege and was allowed use of family car, was not mature because she "demon-
strated unrealistic judgment and perspective in such things as her reliance on
the advice of teenagers, her expectation of keeping the [pregnancy] secret
from her parents .... her dismissal without consideration of the possibility of
experiencing post-abortion depression, her purposeful failure to use contracep-
tives and her cavalier attitude about the ease of abortion").
58. In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d. 249, 263-65 (Tex. 2000) (Owens, J.,
concurring).
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had somewhat considered abortion alternatives including adop-
tion,59 her testimony "did not indicate that [she] understood and
appreciated the gravity and impact of each option before her,"
and it was not evident that "she understood and appreciated the
short- and long-term consequences of her desire to seek an abor-
tion."6° Similarly, Alabama courts have denied bypass to minors
who appeared unreflective as to the moral gravity of abortion61
or its long-term psychological consequences.62
A judge may not, however, afford more weight to the
minor's consideration of the morality of abortion than the gov-
erning law permits. Although one Alabama judge apparently has
required most minors seeking bypass to have first consulted a
pro-life counseling organization,6" requiring such consultation
stretches the limits of the judge's authority. An Alabama appel-
late court reversed a finding of immaturity that was based in part
on the minor's "failure to seek counseling from a facility that
opposes abortion, from her parents, or from a mature relative or
friend."64 The court said that although a minor who does seek
such counseling thereby demonstrates maturity, a minor who
does not seek such counseling does not thereby demonstrate
immaturity.65 A judge who requires every bypass petitioner to
show appreciation of pro-life arguments perhaps adds illegiti-
mately to the exclusive set of requirements for bypass set forth by
statute.66
A judge who evaluates the minor's consideration of the
morality of abortion must also frame the legal inquiry in nonreli-
gious terms distinct from the judge's personal views or convic-
59. In re Petition of Anonymous, 558 N.W.2d 784, 786 (Neb. 1997).
60. Id. at 788.
61. SeeExparteAnonymous, 812 So. 2d 1234, 1238 (Ala. 2001) ("'[T]he
testimony of the minor and the godmother appeared to be rehearsed and...
neither of the two individuals showed any emotion concerning the very serious
request they were making in this proceeding.'").
62. See ExparteAnonymous, 808 So. 2d 1030, 1033 (Ala. 2001) (citing trial
court's findings).
63. See In re Anonymous, 905 So. 2d 845, 848 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (quot-
ing trial judge's order, stating that he routinely required a minor seeking bypass
to consult with "Sav-A-Life, or a similar pro-life organization").
64. In re Anonymous, 733 So. 2d 429, 431 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).
65. Id.
66. See In re Doe, No. 02CA0067, 2002 WL 31492302, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 16, 2002). The appeals court reversed a trial court ruling that a minor was
insufficiently mature. The trial court judge based his ruling on the fact that the
minor had not spoken with any medical provider or person who had had an
abortion. The appeals court found instead that the minor possessed the requi-
site knowledge plainly contemplated by the Ohio bypass statute and was thus
sufficiently mature and well informed.
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tions. An Alabama judge who based a denial of bypass, in part, on
the minor's failure to consider what the judge termed "the spiri-
tual aspects of her decision"67 was reversed and sharply criticized
for making a religiously grounded decision that "superimpose [d]
[the court's] judgment or its moral convictions on the minor.
68
In another Alabama case where the judge referred to the "spiri-
tual consequences" of the minor's abortion decision, the appel-
late court explicitly "question[ed] [the judge's] objectivity in a
judicial-bypass case."69
As for the minor's understanding of fetal life, appellate
courts have not recognized its importance for a well-informed
decision. While appellate decisions have found a minor's aware-
ness of abortion's effects on her own physical health to be impor-
tant, 7° even essential, 71 if she is to be deemed well informed, they
have seldom inquired about the minor's awareness that abortion
destroys an actual or potential human life. The Nebraska
Supreme Court, for example, stated that a minor's inability to
articulate the medical risks of abortion indicated lack of perspec-
tive orjudgment, yet at the same time expressed no concern over
the minor's inability to articulate that what an abortion would, in
her words, "scrape out" of her womb was a life or potential life.7 2
In a Texas bypass hearing, however, the minor's attorney
adduced the minor's willingness to go forward with abortion
despite knowing that her fetus is a human life.73 And an Alabama
67. In re Anonymous, 733 So. 2d 429, 431 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).
68. Id. at 432 (quoting Ex parte Anonymous, 618 So. 2d 722, 725 (Ala.
1993)).
69. In re Anonymous, 905 So. 2d 845, 850 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005).
70. See, e.g., In re Doe, No. 02CA0067, 2002 WL 31492302, at *3 (Ohio Ct.
App. Sept. 16, 2002) (stating that minor's knowledge of abortion procedure
and its risks, with consideration of alternatives to abortion, and favorable testi-
mony about her personal responsibility, were clear and convincing evidence
that she was mature and well enough informed).
71. See In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 256 (Tex. 2000) (requiring the mature
and well-informed minor to show that she has obtained information about and
understands the health risks of abortion).
72. In re Petition of Anonymous 2, 570 N.W.2d 836, 838, 839 (Neb. 1997).
Of course, the American legal system does not generally treat the fetus as "a
life" for the purpose of defining abortion rights. However, for the purpose of
enacting abortion regulations such as waiting periods and informed consent
requirements, the state has a legally-recognized interest in protecting the fetus
as at least potential life. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 871 (1992) (plurality opinion) (specifying the state interest in protecting
potential life).
73. In re Doe 4, 19 S.W.3d 322, 329 (Tex. 2000) (Hecht, J., dissenting)
(indicating minor answered affirmatively to questions, "And we have talked
about that life is very sacred, have we not?" and "And you know that if the Court
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judge found that a minor was well informed in part because she
"ha[d] seen the ultrasound of her child."74
The Alabama judge sensibly applied the "well informed"
standard, as an abortion decision can hardly be well informed if
the minor is oblivious of what abortion really does to unborn life.
However, judges would push the limits of their authority if they
required the minor to understand the effects on the fetus in
every case. Some appellate courts have reversed denials of bypass
where the judge appeared to require an adult level of knowledge
and maturity. 5 If many adult women would be unable to articu-
late to a court the facts of fetal development and what abortion
does to the fetus, judges could easily exceed their authority in
requiring such understanding from a minor.
Further, it could be objected that if a court denies bypass
because the minor has not adequately considered the morality of
abortion or educated herself as to its consequences for her fetus,
the court has imposed an undue burden on the minor's constitu-
tional right to abortion. Yet minors' abortion rights are not
exactly equivalent to adults',76 and the law contemplates burden-
ing them with parental involvement or the time and expense of a
bypass proceeding. Therefore, a legal requirement that would be
an undue burden for an adult may not be one for a minor. If
judicial bypass proceedings are supposed to be meaningful and
not pro forma, then it does not seem unduly burdensome that
the judge ask searching questions going to whether the minor
appreciates the gravity of abortion.
C. Criticizing Permissive Abortion Law
Finally, even if ajudge is legally constrained to order permis-
sion for an abortion, nothing prevents the judge from stating, on
the record, appropriate reservations about this result or the law
that compels it. One judge, for example, accompanied a bypass
order with a statement that the judge "'[did] not condone abor-
grants this, in essence what you are going to do is end a-a life that is already
starting now?").
74. In re Anonymous, 905 So. 2d 845, 848 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005).
75. See, e.g., Ex parte Anonymous, 618 So. 2d 722, 725 (Ala. 1993); In re
Doe, 924 So. 2d 935, 938-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that trial court
applied an incorrect definition of "sufficiently mature" when it "improperly
held Doe to the standard of a fully-grown adult").
76. See Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I1), 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (plurality
opinion) ("[T]he constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with
those of adults .... ").
PRO-LITE JUDGES AND JUDICIAL BYPASS CASES
tion.' , 77 Four justices of the Alabama Supreme Court stated in a
concurring opinion that their decision to uphold a judicial
bypass "should not be construed or understood as expressing our
personal views on whether abortion is right or wrong, whether
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court that govern us
in this area are sound, or whether these decisions will be modi-
fied or overruled in the future. '78 Other judges have more
openly criticized the permissive law they have felt constrained to
apply. Justice Easley of the Mississippi Supreme Court, separately
concurring in a bypass case, opined that the state has a duty "to
protect all life including prenatal life.",79 Justice Easley explained
that with the help of "numerous private, faith-based, and public
agencies," alternatives to abortion are almost always
practicable.8"
Of course, the judge whose written opinion criticizes permis-
sive abortion law could face public criticism for improperly
bringing religion into the public square, even if the judge's argu-
ments are ethically rather than religiously based. The criticism
has some force because a judge's official actions should reflect
publicly accessible and acceptable reasons,8 1 and commonly it is
thought that "[t] he question about the moral worth of the fetus
is not one that anyone can answer on the basis of [generally]
shared premises and publicly accessible reasons."8 2 Yet in spite of
pervasive moral disagreement in our society, moral arguments
against legalized abortion are accessible to all even if religion is
not. A public official who argues that "abortion takes innocent
life which society should protect" and that "our concept of rights
cannot embrace actions so intrinsically evil" may have come "to
believe these things by a specifically [religious] route, but other
people have reached the same conclusions by other roads . . .
and there is nothing sectarian about saving lives."8 3 Perhaps the
problem is that such arguments appeal, at least implicitly, to a
77. In re Anonymous, 720 So. 2d 497, 504 (Ala. 1998) (Hooper, C.J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting trial judge's order).
78. Id.
79. In re R.B., 790 So. 2d 830, 835 (Miss. 2001) (Easely, J., concurring).
80. Id.
81. Judges generally "rely on arguments they believe should have force
for all judges." Kent Greenawalt, Religion and American Political Judgments, 36
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 401, 410 (2001). Judges arguably are those public officials
most directly subject to a requirement that their stated justifications for action
sound in "public reason." SeeJohn Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U.
CHI. L. REv. 765, 768 (1997).
82. John H. Garvey, The Pope's Submarine, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 849, 872
(1993).
83. Id. at 874.
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metaphysics-a comprehensive doctrine of reality-that not all
citizens share.8 4 Natural law theorists, however, argue that "peo-
ple can reason to sound moral judgments without understanding
or accepting any overall theory that explains how these judg-
ments fit with physical reality or God's purposes," suggesting why
"the moral arguments the [natural law] theorist presents might
qualify as public reasons, even though his complete theory defi-
nitely does not."85
There is another argument, to the effect that judicial con-
duct knowingly influenced or motivated by the judge's religious
beliefs violates the Constitution. If a public official "takes official
action for the sole purpose of promoting the religious aims of his
Church" he would act inconsistently with the "Lemon rule against
religious purposes."86 Yet when the judge criticizes pro-abortion
law on ethical premises that, as has been suggested, are funda-
mentally nonsectarian, the Lemon rule may not apply. The Lemon
rule also may be unsound because "[t]he Establishment
Clause . . . is mainly about what laws do, not why they are
enacted." 7 Further, if certain moral intuitions function as neces-
sary presuppositions of our nation's laws, as surely is the case,
then judicial recourse to religious beliefs that make these moral
intuitions accessible should not be constitutionally out-of-
bounds.88
84. Perhaps any argument that abortion gravely violates human dignity
would offend Rawls's principle that arguments applying to "basic political and
social institutions" be such that they "can be presented independently from
comprehensive doctrines of any kind." Rawls, supra note 81, at 776.
85. Kent Greenawalt, Natural Law and Public Reasons, 47 VILL. L. REV. 531,
543 (2002).
86. Garvey, supra note 82, at 875 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612-13 (1971)). Arguably the Establishment Clause then "limits the ability
of judges, like any governmental actors, to excessively involve or advance relig-
ion through their official functions or purposes." Scott C. Idleman, The Conceal-
ment of Religious Values inJudicial Decisionmaking, 91 VA. L. REv. 515, 526 (2005).
See generally Scott C. Idleman, The Limits of Religious Values inJudicial Decisionmak-
ing, 81 MAR%. L. REv. 537 (1998).
87. See Greenawalt, supra note 81, at 412.
88. See Francis J. Beckwith, Taking Theology Seriously: The Status of the Relig-
ious Beliefs ofJudicial Nominees for the Federal Bench, 20 NOTRE DAMEJ. L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'v 455 (2005) (arguing that religious traditions are knowledge tradi-
tions that may as properly inform legal reasoning as other non-legal sources of
information); Stephen D. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 932 (1989) (arguing that our nation's constitutional law is based in part on
moral reasoning and that there is no prima facie reason to exclude religious
traditions from informing such moral reasoning).
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III. MoRAIL ANALYsis: JUDIcIAL BYPAss AND
COOPERATION IN EVIL
So far this Note has considered how bypass law requires the
judge to issue permission for a minor's abortion if the minor is
mature and well informed. Without entirely leaving the legal
frame of reference, this Part considers the moral implications of
a judge so acting. How, if at all, is the judge morally responsible
for the abortion that he or she legally authorizes or gives permis-
sion for?8 9 This inquiry divides into two questions: Does the
judge who issues a bypass violate the moral norm that forbids
intentional killing? If not, is the judge's action still wrongful
because abortion is its forseen side effect? To put it in traditional
moral-theological vocabulary: (1) Does the judge who issues a
bypass order cooperate formally in the act of abortion? (2) If not,
does the judge's act constitute impermissible material coopera-
tion?9" Finding a clear answer may be difficult because assess-
ment of material cooperation is always ad hoc and fact specific.
A. Formal Cooperation?
The pro-life judge recognizes that the moral law proscribes,
without exceptions, any act which is "intended, whether as end
or means, to kill an innocent human being."91 What one chooses
for purposes of moral evaluation is one's proposal for action,
89. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(B) (2003) ("A judge of the
superior court shall . . .authorize a physician to perform the abortion if the
judge determines that the pregnant minor is mature and capable of giving
informed consent to the proposed abortion."). Other statutes describe the judi-
cial action as authorizing the minor to consent to abortion. E.g., FLA. STAT.
§ 390.01114(4)(c) (2007) ("If the court finds ... that the minor is sufficiently
mature to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy, the court shall issue an
order authorizing the minor to consent to .. . a termination of pregnancy.")
(emphasis added). Still other statutes characterize the judicial action as waiving
the parental involvement requirement. Eg., ALA. CODE. § 26-21-4(f) (1992);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6704 (2003).
90. See GERMAIN GRISEZ, 1 WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: CHRISTIAN MORAL PRIN-
CIPLES 301 (1983) ("The idea of the distinction [between formal and material
cooperation] is that one who formally cooperates participates in the immoral
act in such a way that it becomes his or her own, whereas one who materially
cooperates does something which facilitates the immoral act but does not make
it his or her own.").
91. SeeJOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS 141 (1998) [hereinafter FINNIS, AQUINAS]; see
also CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH paras. 2268, 2269 (2d ed. 1997)
[hereinafter CATECHISM] (explaining that the Fifth Commandment forbids both
"direct and intentional killing" and "doing anything with the intention of indi-
rectly bringing about a person's death"). For an explanation of the concept of
exceptionless moral norms, see JOHN FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES: TRADITION,
REVISION, AND TRUTH 1-6 (1991) [hereinafter FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES].
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comprising both the end one seeks and the means one selects to
obtain it.92 These elements comprising one's choice are distin-
guished from results that are their foreseen side-effects; for side-
effects one bears a real, but different and generally lesser,
responsibility.93
The judge cooperates formally if and only if, in choosing to
authorize the minor's abortion pursuant to bypass law, the judge
chooses abortion as an end or a means.94 Compare our judge
with a legislator who enacts a law expanding abortion access:
clearly that legislator chooses, as an end or a means, to make
abortion available. Catholic authorities, therefore, have emphati-
cally instructed Catholic elected officials not to vote for such
laws, explaining that doing so would constitute impermissible
cooperation in evil.95 A judge would engage in similar coopera-
tion if, in choosing between two interpretations of a law, neither
of which the existing body of law compelled, he chose the inter-
pretation that permitted more abortions. That is, ajudge chooses
a pro-abortion outcome if it derives from judicial discretion96
mirroring legislative policy-making.
92. FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES, supra note 91, at 40; see also GRISEZ, supra
note 90, at 233 ("The action of an individual is defined by the proposal adopted
by a choice, just as the action of a group is defined by the motion adopted by a
vote .... Since one's action is defined by the proposal one adopts, one not only
does what one chooses to do as good in itself... but also does what one chooses
to do as a means.").
93. GRISEZ, supra note 90, at 239-40 ("In choosing one establishes one's
existential identity by settling one's personal priorities among the goods on
which the choice bears. One does not determine oneself in the same way with
respect to forseen [sic] side effects, which are neither sought for their own sake
nor included in the proposal one adopts.").
94. Traditionally, "[flormal cooperation is defined as cooperating in a
morally wrongful act while sharing in the immoral intention of the person com-
mitting the act." Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 232 (quotation and citation omit-
ted). Formal cooperation is always morally wrongful.
95. See CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DOCTRINAL NOTE
ON SOME QUESTIONS REGARDING THE PARTICIPATION OF CATHOLICS IN POLITICAL
LIFE para. 4 (2002) [hereinafter DOCTRINAL NOTE] ("John Paul II, continuing
the constant teaching of the Church, has reiterated many times that those who
are directly involved in lawmaking bodies have a 'grave and clear obligation to
oppose' any law that attacks human life. For them, as for every Catholic, it is
impossible to promote such laws or to vote for them.") (citation omitted);
Bishop John Myers, Obligations of Catholics and Rights of Unborn Children, 20 ORI-
GINS 65 (1990) (pastoral statement setting forth duty to refrain from enacting
permissive abortion laws).,
96. On the concept ofjudicial discretion, seeJ. ERIC SMITHBURN,JUDICIAL
DISCRETION 7 (2006) ("'Discretion signifies choice. First, the decision-maker
exercising discretion has the ability to choose from a range of permissible con-
clusions ... . Although the act of choosing will be guided by various legal and
other considerations, the decision-maker, and not the law, decides. .... The trial
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Suppose, however, that the judge's reading of the bypass
statute and applicable case law leads thejudge to conclude that if
he follows the law he must grant an abortion bypass to this minor.
The judge's only options are: (1) to follow the law and grant the
bypass; or (2) to avoid granting the bypass by somehow not apply-
ing the law. If the judge, then, grants the bypass, she still is not
choosing abortion as an end or a means, at least not in the same
way as the pro-abortion legislator or the judge exercising discre-
tion. And under the bypass law examined in Parts I and II, the
judge has minimal discretion when deciding under the mature
and well informed test (the best interests test would allow more
discretion). Under the mature and well informed test, the judge
who uses all the discretion she has to consider the minor's knowl-
edge of fetal life and consideration of the morality of abortion
may still be forced to conclude that this minor is mature and well
informed under any legally-defensible reading of that standard.
In that case, the judge who issues the bypass does not opt for
abortion in a discretionary way and probably does not choose
abortion as an end or a means.
To state the same point positively, the pro-life judge enforc-
ing bypass law has an object and a motivation to her action that
remain distinct from that of the minor seeking an abortion. The
judge who rules that the minor is mature and sufficiently
informed to decide for herself may fervently hope that, upon fur-
ther reflection, the minor decides against abortion. The judge's
"legitimate acts and reasons" for making this ruling may be iden-
tified as, inter alia, "service to the legal system and the provision
of justice in general," "continued employment and the financial
care of self and other dependents," and "opportunities to bring
the Catholic [or other religious] tradition into [bypass] law."
97
Most likely then, a judge who issues a judicial bypass when
she reasonably believes that applying the law compels this result
does not cooperate formally in the evil of abortion. Perhaps this
conclusion is incorrect because, it could be thought, ajudge issu-
ing a bypass order acts as an agent of a permissive abortion law
(or legal order), and agents usually function as formal coopera-
tors with their principals. However, a judge compelled by clearly
established law to order a bypass is an agent with limited discre-
court nevertheless must choose wisely.., with regard to what is right and equi-
table under the circumstances and the law, and directed by the reason and
conscience of the judge to a just result.'" (quoting Johnson v. United States,
398 A.2d 354, 361 (D.C. 1979))).
97. Coughlin, supra note 4, at 306 (explaining these acts and reasons in
the context of judicial involvement in divorce cases).
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tion.9 8 As long as ajudge does not necessarily share in the inten-
tion or proposal of every law he enforces, the judge who enforces
a permissive abortion law does not necessarily choose abortion by
doing so.9 9
B. Material Cooperation?
Suppose the judge knows that if he issues the bypass order, it
will result in the minor obtaining an abortion. The judge will
then, in issuing the bypass, accept two things as foreseen side
effects: the abortion itself, and the fact that the judge's official
action makes it easier for this minor to choose abortion. Under
traditional Catholic moral analysis, "[m]aterial cooperation in
another's evil act is permissible when: (1) the cooperator's act is
good or indifferent in itself; (2) the cooperator has a reason for
acting that is just; and (3) the cooperator's reason [for acting] is
proportionate to the gravity of the wrongdoing and the closeness
of the assistance."' 0 0
Judicial bypass plainly involves material cooperation; the
main issue in determining whether it is permissible is under (3),
the question of proportionality. As suggested earlier, (1) and (2)
likely are satisfied because the judge's act of applying bypass law
to the facts of a particular case is good or indifferent in itself, and
the judge's official duty to enforce the law supplies just reasons
for acting. Whether these reasons are proportionate to the grav-
ity of abortion and the closeness of the judge's assistance to a
particular minor is a difficult and fact-intensive question, as
"questions of proportionality do not easily admit clear
answers."' '° Several discrete factors, however, can guide the anal-
ysis. When considering proportionality in relation to the gravity
of the wrongdoing, we can examine: (1) the gravity of the wrong-
doing in itself-for example, taking a person's life is graver than
harming his reputation or pecuniary interests; (2) the risk of
98. For the proposition that an agent who acts with discretion is likely to
share in the intentions of the principal, see GRISEZ, supra note 90, at 302-03
("Individuals who act as agents for others . .. usually have responsibility as for-
mal cooperators. ... An agent given wide discretion is unlikely to be able to
serve without adopting as his or her own the proposals which the principal
wishes to execute, for the agent with discretion will be unable to do anything
except by proceeding with the principal's own end in view.").
99. Cf. Scalia, supra note 4, at 18 (arguing that a judge who enforces pro-
abortion law is ordinarily not responsible for the death of a human being
because, even if society and its legislators have a moral duty to enact laws
prohibiting abortion, ajudge is not a legislator and "a judge ... bears no moral
guilt for the laws society has failed to enact").
100. Coughlin, supra note 4, at 306.
101. Id. at 307.
PRO-LIFE JUDGES AND JUDICIAL BYPASS CASES
scandal created by the cooperation; and (3) "the bad effects of
the cooperation in proportion to the good that is to be accom-
plished." ' 2 When considering proportionality in relation to the
closeness of the assistance, we can ask: (1) Does the assistance
directly facilitate the wrongdoing, that is, can it be characterized
as proximate rather than remote?; (2) Will foregoing the assis-
tance likely prevent the wrongdoing?; and (3) How interpersonal
is the assistance?
1 0 3
1. Gravity of the Wrongdoing
In the Catholic moral tradition, human life is of utmost
value, and therefore material cooperation in abortion seems to
"require a countervailing reason of a rather significant grav-
ity. ' O° In the bypass context, moreover, judicial cooperation
likely creates a serious risk of scandal to the minor. The Biblical
precept to love one's neighbor implies that one should not "do
anything that causes [one's] brother to stumble."10 5 As the Cate-
chism of the Catholic Church explains, "[s]candal can be pro-
voked by laws or institutions" and "[a] nyone who uses the power
at his disposal in such a way that it leads others to do wrong
becomes guilty of scandal ..... 106 Judge William H. Pryor, Jr.
acknowledges that "[f] or judges and lawyers there is a special
danger of scandal, because '[s]candal is grave when given by
those who by nature or office are obliged to teach and educate
others.' "107
In granting a bypass there is a grave risk of scandal, first,
because any bypass ruling makes the judge function in some
sense like the minor's guardian. The bypass hearing is not for
finding out what the law is, rather it is to determine whether this
particular minor is mature and well enough informed to choose
abortion, or whether abortion is in her best interests. The judge
hears evidence about the minor's life history and experiences,
about her knowledge of the abortion procedure, and about her
understanding of alternatives to abortion. The judge-whose
102. See id. at 307-08; see also GRISEZ, supra note 90, at 241 (explaining
risk of scandal as one factor in the analysis of material cooperation).
103. See Coughlin, supra note 4, at 308-09.
104. Id. at 307 (using this language of "significant gravity" in the context
of unjust divorce cases and Catholic lawyers' involvement such cases).
105. Romans 14:21. As the Catechism of the Catholic Church explains,
"[r]espect for the souls of others" requires that one avoid scandal, which is a
"grave offense if by deed or omission another is deliberately led into a grave
offense." CATECHISM, supra note 91, at para. 2284.
106. Id. at para. 2286, 2287.
107. Pryor, supra note 4, at 360 (quoting CATECHISM, supra note 91, at
para. 2285).
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permission for abortion the minor seeks instead of her parents'
permission-stands to the minor as a figure of authority. If the
judge does not object to the minor's choice of abortion, the
judge's stance will look a lot like approval, or at least
indifference.
Second, the very hermeneutic of a bypass proceeding con-
dones the minor's choice of abortion in a wide range of circum-
stances. Bypass law makes the judge determine whether the
minor is mature and well enough informed to choose abortion,
yet that very inquiry makes no sense if abortion is morally wrong.
It would make no sense, for instance, to ask whether a person is
mature and well enough informed to choose to drive drunk. The
law may also ask the judge to determine whether abortion is in
the minor's best interests; yet again, the form of inquiry makes
no sense if abortion is morally wrong. If abortion is a moral evil,
then it cannot be in anyone's real best interests. Therefore the
judge who, in all seriousness, inquires whether a particular minor
is mature and well enough informed to choose abortion, or
whether abortion is in her best interests, belies any pro-life con-
victions or sympathies that judge may have at heart. Conducting
the bypass hearing under the legally-prescribed terms inevitably,
and inextricably, tells the minor that abortion is a morally per-
missible choice.
2. Closeness of the Assistance
Consideration of the closeness of assistance involved injudi-
cial bypass likewise suggests that cooperation can be justified only
by reasons of significant gravity. The judge's bypass ruling almost
always directly facilitates the abortion. Assuming that the minor
comes to the judge because she is unable or unwilling to go
through her parents, the judge's permission is a legally essential
step for the abortion to be obtained. Although the judge's assis-
tance is proximate, foregoing the assistance will in all likelihood
not prevent the abortion. If the pro-life judge recuses herself,
"there are probably at least several other judges in the jurisdic-
tion who will be willing to hear the case." '
What tips the scales and makes judicial bypass a close form
of assistance is its interpersonal aspect, insofar as the judge inter-
acts with a particular minor about one particular abortion deci-
sion. Bypass cases therefore differ in kind from cases where
108. See Coughlin, supra note 4, at 308 (observing this in the context of
unjust divorce cases). But see Treadwell, supra note 7, at 880 (asserting that in
socially conservative regions of the country, recusals are increasingly common
and likely to prevent expeditious resolution of bypass petitions).
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judges must strike down, under Roe v. Wade, 09 laws that restrict
abortion access unduly. In those constitutionally-based chal-
lenges to general laws, the judge can foresee that applying Roe
likely will result in more abortions. Yet those cases lack the inter-
personal dimension of the bypass case, where the judge must
decide whether this particular minor can have an abortion, and
specifically whether she is mature and well informed enough to
do so.
3. Other Factors
Other moral principles can also factor in the proportionality
analysis, among them, fairness and the Christian calling to bear
witness to the dignity of the human person. According to Grisez,
"Material cooperation is often ruled out by other moral consider-
ations, especially fairness."1 Bypass law, like any permissive
abortion law, is fundamentally unfair because it sanctions the kill-
ing of society's weakest members, often in the interest of the
more powerful. "This consideration about fairness-not the sanc-
tity of life as such-points to what is basically objectionable about
the legalization of abortion, though not about abortion itself." 1 '
If the pro-life judge is Christian, she has further reasons to
refuse cooperation in unfair, permissive abortion laws. As Grisez
has noted, Christian moral standards require a special solicitude
for the weak, the powerless, and the victimized, a group which
includes the unborn:
Christian standards leave less room to act in ways which in
fact facilitate evil, especially when that evil involves serious
harm to others. The demands of mercy and self-oblation
require Christians to avoid cooperation when the immoral
act which is facilitated harms another and the only consid-
eration which might justify cooperation is the good of the
Christian himself or herself.'
12
Christians also have an apostolic responsibility, over and above
the responsibilities the moral law imposes directly, to witness to
the truth about the human person. "[R] efusing to cooperate in
evildoing is often an important way of bearing witness to the
truth."' 13 In this vein, Grisez suggests that "a nurse who prepares
109. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
110. GRISEZ, supra note 90, at 302.
111. Id. at 280; see also Myers, supra note 95, at 70 ("Most material cooper-
ation in abortion is grossly unfair. Only in very limited circumstances will mate-
rial cooperation be consistent with Christ's command that we do unto others as
we would have others do unto us.").
112. GusEz, supra note 90, at 303.
113. Id. at 302.
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patients for abortion," although abortion is no part of her propo-
sal for action, "perhaps ought to look for a differentjob or refuse
to do these preparations by way of testimony to the truth."" 4
4. Conclusion
Whether the pro-life judge's reasons for involvement in a
bypass case are proportionate to the gravity of abortion and the
closeness of assistance depends on what precisely those reasons
are, making the question difficult to answer in the abstract. If the
judge's continued employment and ability to care financially for
self and family depends on hearing and deciding bypass cases,
then the reason is a serious and grave one."' Whether it is seri-
ous and grave enough to correspond to the gravity of facilitating
a minor's abortion is another question.
Perhaps the best resolution is as follows: If the judge can
recuse herself from bypass cases and remain on the bench, she
should do so, but if recusal is not an option, she should consider
resignation.1 16 If the judge can recuse herself from bypass cases,
then deciding them is not a condition of continued employment
or livelihood, and one of the graver reasons for cooperation no
longer applies. The otherjust reason for cooperation, the judge's
obligation to enforce the positive law, by itself appears to lack
proportionate gravity in a bypass case. For if the "central case" of
law is morally upstanding law,11 7 then unjust law, including
bypass law, is not what the judge's office exists to enforce. 18
114. Id.
115. See Coughlin, supra note 4, at 305-06.
116. Cf id. at 306 (stating, in the context of unjust divorce cases, that
"[w]hen an exemption is possible, legal professionals should refuse to cooper-
ate as a sign of 'conscientious objection' to an unjust legal arrangement" (cita-
tion omitted)).
117. As the natural law tradition claims, according to John Gardner,
Nearly Natural Law, 52 AM. J. JuRls. (forthcoming 2007-2008).
118. According to the natural law tradition as incorporated in Catholic
teaching, a law that contravenes the moral order is, for all its empirical reality,
not fully a law as regards the moral sphere. See FINNIS, AQUINAS, supra note 91, at
272 ("Obviously, if the law purports to require its subjects to do things of the
sort that no one should ever do, it cannot rightly be complied with; one's moral
obligation is not to obey but to disobey. And if it purports to authorize such acts
(e.g., rape, theft, infanticide), its authorization is morally void and of no effect."
(citations omitted)); Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From Birmingham Jail, in PHI-
LOSOPHY OF LAW 219, 221 (Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds., 2000) (arguing
that there is no moral obligation to obey an unjust law, that is, "a human law
that is not rooted in eternal and natural law"). Unjust laws "can have no bind-
ing force in conscience." JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE: THE GOSPEL OF LIFE
para. 72 (1995) [hereinafter EVANGELIUM VrTAE]. John Paul II notes, "Abortion
and euthanasia are thus crimes which no human law can claim to legitimize.
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Although each pro-life judge considering whether to decide
bypass cases will have to weigh the matter in his or her own con-
science, the conclusion that issuing a judicial bypass involves
wrongful material cooperation is not unprecedented. Antonin
Scalia has said that a judge who believes capital punishment is
immoral cannot, in good conscience, materially cooperate with a
death sentence by affirming it on appeal." 9 Catholic scholars
John Garvey and Amy Coney Barrett suggest the same in their
nuanced analysis of the issue. 2 For Garvey and Barrett, ajudge's
cooperation in capital punishment is problematic for two rea-
sons: it causes the death of a human being and may give rise to
scandal when the judge appears to approve of that death.'2 1 Judi-
cial cooperation in a minor's decision to abort is no less grave.
V. RESOLVING THE MoRAL DILEMMA: RECUSA.
If the pro-life judge believes in conscience that issuing a
bypass would be immoral, the judge must follow his or her con-
science and find a way to avoid issuing the order. 22 Morality also
requires that the judge act in fairness to the legal system. 121 If the
legal system requires judges to hear and decide all manner of
cases regardless of moral scruples, the judge's only fair option for
resolving the moral dilemma may be resignation from the bench.
If, however, the system permits judges to recuse themselves from
morally repugnant cases, and if systematic recusal from bypass
cases would not be unfair, then the pro-life judge can resolve the
conflict between conscience and duty through recusal instead.
There is no obligation in conscience to obey such laws; instead there is a grave
and clear obligation to oppose them by conscientious objection." Id. at para. 73.
119. Scalia posits that "[w]here . . . the appellate judge merely deter-
mines that the [death] sentence pronounced by the trial court is in accordance
with law, perhaps the principle of material cooperation could be applied.
But... that principle demands that the good deriving from the cooperation
exceed the evil which is assisted. I find it hard to see how any appellate judge
could find this condition to be met. . . ." Scalia, supra note 4, at 18.
120. See Garvey & Coney, supra note 4, at 342.
121. See id. ("Unless [the appellate judge] intervenes, the defendant will
die. And his act of affirming, whatever its legal significance might be, looks a lot
like approval of the sentence.").
122. Indeed, "[a] human being must always obey the certain judgment of
his conscience. If he were to deliberately act against it, he would condemn him-
self." CATECHISM, supra note 91, at para. 1790. Grisez emphasizes that "[w]hen
duties would require one to do something inconsistent with an absolute
[moral] norm, the latter prevails." GmusEz, supra note 90, at 296.
123. See GRIsEz, supra note 90, at 296 ("[W]hen a duty requires a choice
contrary to what a nonabsolute norm would indicate if the requirement of duty
did not exist, one must resolve the conflict by formulating a more specified
norm in accord with fairness.").
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Many commentators consider recusal an option for judges
in cases involving moral conflict. Garvey and Barrett, for exam-
ple, have argued that Catholic judges who follow their Church's
teaching against capital punishment should recuse themselves
from direct participation in capital sentencing. 124 At least one
author has argued that ajudge's pro-life beliefs could amount to
bias requiring recusal from abortion bypass cases.1 25 Others have
suggested, more generally, that recusal is legally and morally
appropriate for a judge convinced that enforcing a certain law
would be immoral. 126 Some Tennessee trial judges have in fact
opted for recusal in bypass cases. 127 However, a fellow judge in
their circuit criticized their choice, arguing that a judge obliged
by oath of office to uphold all the laws of a jurisdiction cannot
fairly recuse himself simply because the law to be applied is
repugnant. 128
Is a judge legally permitted to recuse herself from a case, or
a category of cases, when moral conscience conflicts with the law
she would be bound to apply? Is a judge legally required to do
so? These questions reduce to a single inquiry because recusal is
not supposed to be discretionary with the judge. The American
Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct provides: "A
judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge, except
when disqualification is required .... 121
The Model Code, however, allows the judge flexibility to
determine when disqualification is required. Rule 2.11 provides
that ajudge "shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding
in which thejudge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned,
including but not limited to" enumerated circumstances. 130 The
124. Garvey & Coney, supra note 4, at 305-06; see also Robert W. Tuttle,
Death's Casuistry, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 371, 371-72 (1998) (explaining and largely
agreeing with Garvey and Coney's argument).
125. Osborn, supra note 7, at 903-04.
126. James L. Buckley, The Catholic Public Servant, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 1992,
at 18, 19 ("Should I ever be asked to hear a case in which the application of the
law might result in my material complicity in an immoral act, I would have to
examine my conscience and, if it so dictated, recuse myself."); LEV, supra note 4,
at 640 (reporting similar comments by judicial nominee Stephen Breyer).
127. Adam Liptak, Some Judges Are Opting Out of Abortion Cases, CHI. DAILv
L. BULL., Sept. 7, 2005, at 2; see also D'Army Bailey, The Religious Commitments of
Judicial Nominees-Address by Judge Bailey, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 443, 443-44 (2006).
128. Liptak, supra note 127 (quoting Judge D'Army Bailey as stating that
a Tennessee judge is "sw[orn] to uphold all of the laws of Tennessee" even if he
disagrees with certain of them); Bailey, supra note 127, at 444 ("The price of a
judge's conscience would be to step down from the bench.").
129. MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.6 (2007) (emphasis added).
130. Id. 2.11.
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standard is not whether the judge can in fact apply the law impar-
tially, but whether he or third parties could reasonably doubt
that he will apply the law impartially.1"' If the judge believes that
it would be immoral to apply the law in favor of one party to the
case, she may doubt whether, when it comes time for legal deci-
sionmaking, she will in fact apply the law objectively, her moral
judgment notwithstanding.
The judge, therefore, who believes it would be immoral to
give one party the benefit of law arguably has actual prejudice
against that party, or the possibility of prejudice sufficient to
compel disqualification.1 3 2 Garvey and Barrett argue that the
phrase "personal bias or prejudice" in the federal recusal statute
broadly encompasses "some illegitimate reason for wanting to
rule against this particular party" even if the judge does not "have
it in for this defendant" in the sense of personal animosity.13 The
same authors think that a judge with scruples of conscience
against the death penalty may lack impartiality in a capital case
like a juror with such scruples.1 3 1 If a juror set against the death
penalty deprives the state of a fair opportunity to apply death-
penalty law, ajudge set against abortion may just as well deprive a
minor seeking bypass of a fair opportunity to gain the benefit of
bypass law. In order to avoid the possibility of that procedural
unfairness-a possibility where the judge's impartiality "might
reasonably be questioned"-the pro-life judge could recuse
herself. 135
131. A federal judge must disqualify himself not only "in any proceeding
in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned" but also for actual
bias or prejudice, "where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party." 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000).
132. See Garvey & Coney, supra note 4, at 343 n.161 ("There are several
reported cases where litigants have claimed that the judge's religious belief has
caused actual bias sufficient to disqualify him under [federal law]. All such
claims have failed for lack of proof.").
133. Id. at 332-33; see also Richard B. Saphire, Religion and Recusal, 81
MARQ. L. REv. 351, 353-54 (1998) ("Garvey and Coney suggest... that recusal
is required where the judge's ability to determine the facts or apply the law is, in
some fundamental way, skewed or distorted by the judge's moral or conscien-
tious scruples.").
134. Garvey & Coney, supra note 4, at 333. The Supreme Court has held
that the state may exclude from capital cases jurors who are "irrevocably com-
mitted" to vote against the death penalty. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,
522 (1968); cf. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 298 (1892) (holding that a
juror is not impartial for this purpose if his scruples "prevent him from standing
indifferent between the government and the accused").
135. See T.L.J. v. Webster, 792 F.2d 734, 739 n.4 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Regard-
less of personal discomfort with the law, it is the duty of judges to apply it. If
they cannot do so with a clear conscience, then they should remove themselves
from this category of cases.").
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Perhaps a conflict between the judge's moral conscience
and his duty to apply the law operates like a conflict between that
duty and any personal interest of the judge in the outcome of the
proceeding. Either conflict prevents the judge from standing
neutral as to the outcome. For this reason, Judge Pryor con-
cludes that recusal is a "simple remedy" available for a conflict
between legal and moral duty: the Model Code requires recusal
in any proceeding in which the judge might lack partiality, and
"[a] judge cannot be impartial to his moral duty."' 36 In particu-
lar, a judge who believes or suspects that it would be a mortal sin
to grant the bypass has the strongest personal interest in avoiding
that result. That interest seems comparable in the force of its
influence, if wholly distinct in its nature, to the interest of ajudge
whose pecuniary affairs are mingled with those of a party. If the
underlying principle of recusal law is that a judge should disqual-
ify himself in any proceeding in which the judge's passions or
interests could stand in the way of impartially applying the law,
then a pro-life judge could conclude that the law requires recusal
from bypass cases.
If the law does not appear settled, policy considerations sug-
gest any doubt be resolved in favor of allowing recusal for such
moral reasons. Arguably, American society, and its judicial sys-
tem, should afford judges the right to recusal in cases of moral
conflict rather than force judges who follow their conscience to
resign. Pope John Paul II has argued that refusal to cooperate in
evil is not only a moral duty, it is also a human right; therefore,
medical or other professionals who refuse to cooperate in abor-
tion should be immune from legal or financial penalties. 37 Of
course, service as an American judge is a privilege and not a
right; perhaps exclusion from judicial office is not an unfair
price to pay for following one's conscience.13 s Yet if a rule against
recusal for moral reasons had the effect of excluding a substan-
tial number of religious believers from office, because of their
religion, it arguably would violate the spirit of the Constitution's
"no religious test" clause.139 Normatively, it has been argued that
136. Pryor, supra note 4, at 361.
137. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 118, at para. 74; cf. 43 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 955.2 (West 1991) (granting immunity from liability to hospital or hospi-
tal employee who refuses, for moral or ethical reasons, to perform or cooperate
in abortion or sterilization).
138. Cf Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the
individual has no constitutional right to exemption from generally applicable
laws that incidentally burden a religious practice).
139. U.S. CONsT. art. VI. ("[N]o religious test shall ever be required as a
qualification to any office or public trust under the United States."); Feminist
Women's Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 69 F.3d 399, 400 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
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"[t]he community should not command judges with moral
qualms to order abortions or sign death sentences" in part
because if "[these judges] resign, the wider community has lost
the service and talent of some of its best judges.""14
Recusal, however, has costs which judges should consider in
deciding whether it is prudent or fair. First, if some judges recuse
themselves from bypass cases, other judges will be compelled to
hear and decide a larger number of them. These are cases that
no judge, even the pro-choice judge, relishes.141 Accordingly,
when several Tennessee judges in one circuit recused themselves
from bypass cases, Judge Bailey, as a fellow judge in their circuit,
doubted whether that recusal was fair.14 2 Second, might recusal
from bypass cases possibly compromise the judge's ability to func-
tion as a judge in other matters, particularly that of upholding
the public confidence in judicial impartiality?14 Would a judge
known for recusing himself from bypass cases for moral reasons
earn public approval for his transparency, or would he be criti-
cized for mingling his judicial functions too much with "per-
sonal" pro-life convictions?
14 4
V. RESOLVING THE MORAL DILEMMA: RESIGNATION
Resignation is the other option, and a judge may feel com-
pelled to it who believes that retaining judicial office is incompat-
ible or inconsistent with refusing to hear a certain kind of case or
apply a certain law. 145 Resignation may also reveal the judge's
pro-life stance with greater transparency, especially if accompa-
that if party could disqualify the judge from abortion-related case, because of
judge's "fervently-held" beliefs and nothing more, that result would violate the
"no religious test" clause); Garvey & Coney, supra note 4, at 348-50 (arguing
that mandatory disqualification of judges because of their religious affiliations
would not be consistent with the clause).
140. Bruce Ledewitz, An Essay ConcerningJudicial Resignation and Non-Coop-
eration in the Presence of Evil, 27 DuQ. L. REv. 1, 3 (1988).
141. I am indebted to Amy Coney Barrett for this common-sense point.
142. Bailey, supra note 127, at 444.
143. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007) ("A judge
shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
judiciary ....").
144. See Michael Stokes Paulsen & Steffen N. Johnson, Scaha's Sermonette,
72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 863 (1997) (noting public criticism ofJustice Scalia for
extrajudicial, religious remarks made at prayer breakfast).
145. See Joseph W. Moylan, No Law Can Give Me the Right to Do What Is
Wrong, in LIFE AND LEARNING V: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIvr UNivERSiTy FACULTY
FOR LIFE CONFERENCE 234, 237 (Joseph W. Koterski ed., 1996) (suggesting that
Nebraska Code of Judicial Ethics did not permit him to remain a judge and
refuse to hear bypass cases); Scalia, supra note 4, at 18 (stating that ajudge who
believes the death penalty is immoral should resign "rather than simply ignor-
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nied by a statement of reasons. Resignation, then, may afford a
more powerful witness than recusal because it evidences the
judge's willingness to give up professional position and reputa-
tion in order to respect unborn life.146 When Judge Moylan, striv-
ing to live as a faithful Catholic, resigned from the bench rather
than authorize a minor's abortion, he invited a local newspaper
to run a story, which it did. Although Moylan's resignation
received little attention from the general press, several national
Christian magazines published about it. 47 People across the
country wrote to Moylan praising his courage and attesting that
his example inspired them to live pro-life convictions more
generously. 148
Judicial resignations accompanied by judges' criticism of
legalized abortion and of the Supreme Court decisions constitu-
tionalizing it could also educate the public.14 The judge's criti-
cism should contain "a truthful description of 'what is going
on'"150 when a judge authorizes a minor's abortion, bringing to
light the moral situation faced by the judge and by the minor.
The judge should explain that abortion is neither a medical pro-
cedure 51 nor a mere "termination of pregnancy"'152 but the tak-
ing duly enacted, constitutional laws and sabotaging death penalty cases," but
not explicitly addressing recusal).
146. Compare this with the story of Michigan judge Randall Hekman,
who, when called upon to order an abortion for a minor ward of the court,
refused to do so "on the alternative grounds (i) that it was not in the best inter-
ests of the girl; and (ii) that he would in any event feel compelled to reject the
authority of Roe as a lawless and immoral decision." After suffering public
recrimination, Hekman eventually was cleared of judicial misconduct charges.
Paulsen, supra note 1, at 81 (citing RANDALL HERMAN, JUSTICE FOR THE UNBORN
(1984)).
147. Moylan, supra note 145, at 240.
148. Id. at 241.
149. See Ledewitz, supra note 140, at 11 ("The act of judicial] resigna-
tion ... also serves as a symbolic protest designed to persuade the majority to
change its view."); Paulsen, supra note 1, at 77 ("Criticism of Roe's result by the
men and women of the judiciary is an important and necessary contribution to
both moral reasoning and law; it undermines the moral legitimacy of an
immoral holding.").
150. Richard W. Garnett, Christian Witness, Moral Anthropology, and the
Death Penalty, 17 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 541, 543 (2003). Garnett
suggests that religious believers should contribute to the public debate over the
death penalty an account of what an execution is, morally and anthropologi-
cally. Id. at 542-43, 549.
151. Contra MINN. STAT. § 144.343 (2005) (codifying parental notification
for abortion law as an exception to the general rules regarding minors' consent
to "medical, mental and other health services" related to pregnancy); Planned
Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 677 N.E.2d 101, 102 (Mass.
1997) (characterizing judicial authorization for a minor's abortion as authoriza-
tion for a "medical procedure").
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ing of human life at its earliest and most vulnerable stage. '
Although the judge should avoid any demeaning, insulting, or
otherwise offensive tone,' 54 he should not shrink from calling
the evil of abortion by its real name. 55 Federal judge Richard
Casey performed this task heroically in deciding a case involving
abortion regulations. 156 Although applying Supreme Court pre-
cedent that rendered a partial-birth abortion ban unconstitu-
tional, Judge Casey's findings of fact left no doubt about the
violence that abortion inflicts on a living fetus. 157 The judge who
resigns should also criticize the legal reasoning of Roe v. Wade
and its progeny,1 58 explaining that these cases are simply bad
constitutional law.'15 If enough judges resign rather than enforce
permissive abortion laws, they may influence public opinion and
thereby facilitate a shift in the legal climate.
A pro-life judge who resigns could also make a moral argu-
ment for why the American people should protect unborn per-
sons' right to life. 160 Such an argument would challenge the
moral-anthropological claims on which the Supreme Court has
posited the right to abortion as an exercise of autonomy. The
152. Contra FLA. STAT. § 390.01114 (2005) (bypass statute terming abor-
tion an "induce[ment] of termination of pregnancy").
153. See GERMAIN GRISEZ, ABORTION: THE MYrHS, THE REALITIES, AND THE
ARGUMENTS 273-87 (1970); Stephen D. Schwarz, Personhood Begins at Conception,
in THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY: 25 YEARS AFTER ROE v. WADE (Louis P. Pojman
& Francis J. Beckwith eds., 1994) (both arguing that a fetus is an unborn
human person).
154. See In re Anonymous, 905 So. 2d 845, 850 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (criti-
cizing trial judge for highlighting the moral issue by means of a "demeaning"
and "sarcastic" tone that called into question the judge's objectivity in a bypass
case).
155. In one dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia characterized partial-birth
abortion as "killing a human child" and a "visibly brutal means of eliminating
our half-born posterity." Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
156. See Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
157. Id. at 466 (describing "D & X" procedure and reporting expert testi-
mony that a fetus "likely feels severe pain" as it is killed). Judge Casey wrote that
"the testimony at trial and before Congress establishes that D & X is a grue-
some, brutal, barbaric, and uncivilized medical procedure." Id. at 479.
158. See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 78.
159. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that abortion is not constitution-
ally protected because "(1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing about it,
and (2) the longstanding traditions of American society have permitted it to be
legally proscribed").
160. See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 78 (suggesting that a pro-life judge
recuse himself from an abortion case after issuing an opinion explaining "the
natural right to life").
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judge should not hesitate to argue that the "mystery passage" in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey 6' is an appealing but ultimately false
account of what it means to be human. The judge should argue,
in contrast to the Casey dictum, that the foundation of human
and civil rights derives from human dignity that runs far deeper
than merely humans' capacity to make autonomous choices.162
Such a peaceful appeal to the public conscience for the altera-
tion of unjust laws has formed an important part of the American
political tradition, notably in the 1960s civil rights movement.
163
Resignation, too, has its costs. If pro-life judges resign, they
can no longer advance the pro-life cause in the judicial arena,
through, for example, enforcing common-law doctrines that pro-
tect the human person and upholding legitimate legislative
restrictions on abortion, euthanasia, and the like. Many legal
commentators would lament if pro-life judges chose to resign
their offices.' 64 For the Catholic Church, too, this could be a bad
result, inconsistent with the Church's exhortation for lay
Catholics to participate in public life through elected and
appointed public office. 165 Perhaps pro-life judges who resign
could consider other forms of public service in the executive or
legislative arenas.
VI. CONCLUSION
As this Note has shown, the pro-life judge who rules on abor-
tion bypass cases faces a potentially irreconcilable conflict
between the law and his or her moral conscience. Legally, the
judge must authorize an abortion for a minor who establishes
that she is mature and well enough informed to make the deci-
161. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 ("At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life.").
162. See Garnett, supra note 150, at 556-58 (arguing that religious believ-
ers should propose to the public a more truthful anthropology than that con-
tained in the Casey "mystery passage").
163. See Martin Luther King, Jr., supra note 118, at 222 ("[A]n individual
who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and who willingly accepts
the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the commu-
nity over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for law.").
164. Cf Scalia, supra note 4, at 21 (doubting that it would "be a good
thing" if "American Catholics were ineligible to go on the bench in all jurisdic-
tions imposing the death penalty").
165. The Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith has stated that "'the
lay faithful are never to relinquish their participation in 'public life', that is, in
the many different economic, social, legislative, administrative and cultural
areas, which are intended to promote organically and institutionally the com-
mon good.'" DOCTRINAL NoTE, supra note 95, at para. 1 (quotingJoHN PAUL II,
CHRISTIFIDELES LAICI para. 42 (1988)).
PRO-IbFE JUDGES AAD JUDICIAL BYPASS CASES
sion on her own. Although the judge may, in some jurisdictions,
appoint a guardian for the fetus and scrutinize the minor's
understanding of the gravity of abortion, the judge has no discre-
tion to deny permission for an abortion that would be immoral
or unwise. Even if the judge grants bypass solely because the law
compels that result, and therefore does not choose abortion as
an end or a means, the bypass still facilitates the death of an
innocent human being and tends to condone the minor's mor-
ally wrongful choice. This raises the issue of whether such mate-
rial cooperation is permissible. If possible, the judge should
recuse herself from these cases as a sign of conscientious objec-
tion to an unjust legal arrangement. If recusal is not possible, the
judge should ask whether the reasons for cooperation and
remaining on the bench are proportionate to the gravity of abor-
tion and the closeness of the judge's assistance. The judge should
consider, generally and in particular cases, whether this balance
of reasons requires resignation from the bench.
As fitting in a journal devoted to Judeo-Christian perspec-
tives on the law, this Note closes with observations on the dialec-
tic between the Christian judge's duties as ajudge and his or her
responsibilities as a Christian. The judicial duty to enforce posi-
tive law fundamentally involves seeking justice within the status
quo, not changing law or legal institutions to conform more fully
to the moral order.'66 The judicial duty therefore stands in ten-
sion with the Christian citizen's responsibility to permeate the
life of society with moral values, whether or not the status quo
recognizes or affirms those values.' 6v Although civil society and
166. As Kalscheur explains, "[w]hile the role of the legislator is to strive
to embody in positive law those policies that will ... best promote the common
good, the role of the judge with respect to the common good is significantly
different." Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 226-27. "Instead, the primary role of the
judge [in the American constitutional system] is to use the tools of legal analysis
to interpret the constitution and laws, and to apply those laws as they exist in
the context of deciding individual cases." Id. And even when constitutional con-
struction is at issue, various sides acknowledge that justices are not simply free
to enact their own views of what is just or good or expedient, but owe fidelity to
the American people's history and sense of moral values. Compare Pryor, supra
note 4, at 357 ("The business of using moral judgment to change the law is
reserved to the political branches .... ), with WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., Construing
the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 2, 4 (1985).Justice Brennan rejects forced
adherence to the Constitution's original meaning, but acknowledges that jus-
tices "speak for their community, not for themselves alone" when they interpret
the Constitution. "The act of interpretation must be undertaken with full con-
sciousness that it is, in a very real sense, the community's interpretation that is
sought." Brennan, supra.
167. Christian lay faithful, "guided by a Christian conscience in conform-
ity with its values ... exercise their proper task of infusing the temporal order
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its law enjoy a rightful autonomy from the Church and from the
specifically religious sphere, they are not autonomous from the
moral order.1 68 Rather, Christians and all citizens have the right
and duty to "seek the truth with sincerity and to promote and
defend . . . moral truths concerning society, justice, freedom,
respect for human life and the other rights of the person." '169
When the positive law already reflects the truth about human
persons and their rights, the Christian judge's duty to uphold the
law and his obligation to serve moral values reinforce one
another. When, as is the case with our abortion laws, the positive
law stands morally wanting, the Christian judge faces her
toughest dilemma. Ultimately, the judge, as a morally responsible
human being, must resolve any conflict between the exercise of
office and the demands of morality in favor of morality. That is,
she must yield judicial power to the transcendent demands of
goodness and justice.
Although this Note has tended toward negative conclusions,
its moral analysis is rooted in a positive value, the transcendent
dignity and worth of every human person. The pro-life judge who
recuses himself from a case or resigns to avoid complicity in abor-
tion is refusing to choose ahead of the fundamental good of
human life goods that are lesser and properly subordinate. The
pro-life judge who is Christian will recognize in this demand of
conscience a call to gospel self-denial. Such self-denial is not ulti-
mately negative, but serves the positive values of human life, dig-
nity, and true freedom.17 ° The Christian judge who undertakes
such self-denial will do so mindful of "the fascinating but also
demanding truth which Christ reveals to us . . . : 'Whoever
receives one such child in my name receives me' (Mt. 18:5);
'Truly, I say to you, as you did it to one of the least of these my
brethren, you did it to me' (Mt. 25:40). "171
with Christian values, all the while respecting the nature and rightful autonomy
of that order, and cooperating with other citizens according to their particular
competence and responsibility." DOCTRINAL NOTE, supra note 95, at para. 1
(footnotes and emphasis omitted).
168. See id.
169. Id. at para. 6.
170. See EVANGELIUM VrrAE, supra note 118, at para. 2 (describing the
Church's proclamation of the right to life as motivated by the "incomparable
value of every human person" revealed in the mystery of Redemption).
171. Id. at para. 104.
